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The ruling Turkish Justice and Development Party (AK Parti) is often called Islamist or Islamic-
rooted, since their accession to power in 2002, they have enjoyed the support of the majority of the 
Muslim communities of the country. These pious brotherhoods normally have a spiritual agenda 
and do not interfere with the political sphere. Unlike other groups, the Gulen Movement tried to 
establish close links with the political elite and later on to introduce their own elements into the 
democratic arena. Gulen, the founding preacher of the community named after him, created a large 
network of schools, dormitories and cultural venues and positioned his followers in important 
positions of the civil service. This “state in the state” parallel structure became more and more 
uncomfortable for the AK Parti government and decided to uproot it by closing down the Gulenist 
schools, Gulen’s main source of revenue and centers of indoctrination. Operations from both sides 
have been common since the 17th December, 2013 when key government figures were put under 
arrest by Gulenist prosecutors. It is clear that after this conflict Gulenist distanced themselves from 
the Justice and Development Party, but political analysts are still unaware of their current political 
affiliation. 




The Turkish Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AK Parti), 
since its foundation and rise to power in 2002, has been representing the Muslim 
masses and the core Islamic values in a secular system. For this very reason, the AK 
Parti could successfully gather most Turkish Islamic communities and mystical 
brotherhoods. One of the largest of these communities, if not the largest one, used 
to be the Gulen Movement named after its initiator, Fethullah Gulen, a very 
authoritative Muslim preacher. Unlike most other Muslim groups supporting the 
ruling party, the Gulen Movement (or the Cemaat or Community as it is known to 
the Turks) has its own political agenda, therefore their aims might conflict with 
interests of the government. This conflict is very special in the sense that the 
members of the Cemaat secretly infiltrated into many important positions in the 
civil service.  
Observing this clash resembling that of Quranic Habil and Qabil or Biblical 
Abel and Cain, one has the feeling that the participants are of the same origin, they 
all come from the early Turkish Islamic movements but have very different goals. 
Regarding their common origin, it is legitimate to wonder whether this “narcissism 
of small differences” (Freud, 1991) could be overcome or not. The aim of our 
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analysis is to demonstrate how it is possible to reconcile the two approaches: that of 
the AK Parti trying to build a society suitable for Muslims, and that of the Gulen 
movement focusing on the individual, which - due to a slow spiritual and religious 
transformation process - becomes a useful element of a future Muslim society. So, 
the AK Parti intends to change the society directly, the Gulenists take care of the 
Muslim individuals and by doing so, they indirectly form a society of practising 
Muslims. Despite the difference in the approach, both of them aim at creating an 
almost identical social structure. Obviously the partisans of the former one in 
Turkey are more numerous and the Gulenists are losing ground, so, if the open 
conflict continues in this way, the latter ones risk disappearing from Turkish 
politics and the sphere of civil society organizations and NGOs. We can assume 
that the ending of the dispute is in the interest of the Gulen movement, but its 
reunification with the mainstream Muslims is that of the whole Turkish nation. As 
far as our academic evaluation is concerned, we have to provide a methodology to 
strengthen this future national reunification in order to avoid inner discord at a 
time when Turkey is challenged by many political conflicts. and to prevent the 
destabilizing effects of external threats. 
 
Who is Fethullah Gulen? 
Fethullah Gulen is an influential Turkish religious figure, who was born in 1941 in 
the northern mountainous province of Erzurum. In his early ages, he got impressed 
by one Turkey’s leading contemporary Muslim scholar, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi 
whose main work Risale-i Nur (Letters of Light) became one of the sources of 
Gulen’s teachings such as inter-religious tolerance and dialogue, compliance with 
modernity, the importance of scientific learning and scholarship. Gulen managed to 
gather supporters first in Turkey, then in various other parts of the World as well. 
He used different means in order to promote his ideas. Already in the 1960’s, 
Gulen took part in the People’s Houses (Halkevleri) movement giving support to 
popular education, environment, women’s and disabled rights. Later, he developed 
a large network of student dormitories, preparatory schools and cultural facilities 
and launched a certain number of religious and cultural events such as the 
“Olympic Games of the Turkish Language” aiming at fostering a solid Cemaat or 
Muslim community. This brotherhood was later named Nur Cemaat (Community 
of Light) reusing a key element of Said Nursi’s ideas or Hizmet (Service), a central 
concept in the life of the Turkish Muslim groups. This Cemaat came to be known 
as Gulen Movement in the West. 
Besides his religious and cultural missions, Fethullah Gulen is also firmly linked 
to the political sphere. Already in 1971, after the second military coup in Turkey, 
the political police arrested Gulen who – at that time – did not play any political 
role but gave sermons in a local mosque. The reason behind his arrest and the 
arrest of many other mosque speakers was to put pressure on practising Muslims 
throughout the country. The next year, Gulen was put under arrest once more and 
served a three year long prison term for his speeches. After the coup d’Etat of 
1980, Gulen had to flee to the southern city of Izmir not to be arrested again. In 
the 1980’s, the political consolidation permitted Gulen to become an acknowledged 
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journalist and to establish good relations with major political parties. Among his 
contacts one can find even prime ministers such as Turgut Ozal, Bulent Ecevit and 
Tansu Ciller. His movement started to grow slowly and many of his followers took 
office in the civil service. “Democratic openness in the 1990s prompted Gulen 
movement members to penetrate strategic state institutions in the judiciary, security 
and education sectors. The group began to exercise strong influence in society 
given its ownership of large education, media and cultural institutions, acting as a 
power with the government and prompting competition” (Thalji, 2014) between 
the group itself and the government. With the words of Ali Carkoglu, “the most 
significant difference of the Gulen movement compared to all other and earlier 
pro-Islamist conservative circles is their long-term investment in placing their 
cadres of sympathizers into the state bureaucracy. The movement is determined to 
follow an autonomous line of policy formulation and influence rather than just 
adopting a servant’s role.” (Carkoglu, 2014) 
Gulen first visited the United States of America in 1992. Later, he used to return 
to that country quite frequently. After the 1997 postmodern coup and the 
degradation of his health, he decided to move permanently to the US where he lives 
in a huge palace in the state of Pennsylvania. An American journalist describes this 
place as follows: “the leader of what is arguably the world’s most successful Islamic 
movement lives in a tiny Pennsylvania town called Saylorsburg, at the Golden 
Generation Worship and Retreat Center, otherwise known as “the Camp.” The 
Camp consists of a series of houses, a community center, a pond, and some 
tranquil, woodsy space for strolling. From this Poconos enclave – which resembles 
a resort more than the headquarters of a worldwide religious, social, and political 
movement.” (Hansen, 2014) The Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
frequently refers to him as the “Man of Pennsylvania” as Gulen opted for dwelling 
in that state. In the United States of America, his presence is a highly debated issue, 
while he argues that he stays there because his heart was operated several times by 
the specialists of the Mayo Clinic, an American health care service provider, his 
opponents think that he is supported by foreign forces and he serves foreign 
interests. 
 
Gulen and politics 
The Gulen Movement originally had good links with both sides of the Turkish 
political arena. For instance, Gulen was the one who led the burial prayer of Kasim 
Gulek, the Secretary General of the left wing Republican People’s Party, but he had 
connection with the ruling AK Parti as well. The Nurcular (members of the Gulen 
Movement) were widely believed for a long time to support the conservatives with 
their votes.  
As we stated earlier, in its methodology and in its approach to society and 
politics, there has been a visible difference between the Gulen Movement and the 
Milli Gorus or National Vision movement backing political Islamism and various 
political parties including the AK Parti since 2002. The Gulenists’ ideal was the 
pious Muslim trained by the means of education and culture. “Up until the late 
1990s, the Gülen and Milli Görüş movements were representing almost opposite 
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perspectives. The Gülen movement was focusing on faith service (iman hizmeti), 
by publishing magazines and books about Islamic faith, opening student housings 
and dormitories, and bringing business people together to fund this activities.” 
(Kuru, 2007) The emerging Islamists at the same historical period wanted to create a 
society where Muslim principles prevail. “The Milli Görüş movement, however, 
was representing political Islamism in Turkey, by founding Islamist political 
parties.” (Kuru, 2007) Some researcher even finds that in spite of the undeniable 
cooperation of this two spheres of Islamic and political activism, we can speak of 
collateral existence: “The Fethullah Gülen movement grew in parallel with the 
visibility of Islam in politics, i.e. the success of Islamist parties such as the MSP, RP, 
FP (Virtue Party), SP (Felicity Party) and, later on, the Muslim-conservative AKP. “ 
(Seufert. 2014) 
The ideological division between the Nur Cemaat and the ruling party was 
evident from that moment when the government decided to close down the so 
called preparatory schools in Turkey (Table 1), the split between the Nur Cemaat 
and the ruling party was evident. According to government sources, these schools 
were providing education for those willing to begin their studies at prestigious 
universities and preparing for their entrance exams – several times belonging to the 




Number of centers run, students taught and teachers employed  
in Gulen's prep schools 
 
Year Centres Students Teachers 
2000-2001 1,864 523,244 18,175 
2005-2006 2,984 784,565 30,537 
2010-2011 4,055 1,234,738 50,232 
Source: Thalji 
 
The AK Parti government started to speak about closing down these prep schools 
from the second half of the year 2012. The government argued that these schools 
were expensive and not accessible for everyone, all Turkish students should be able 
to get all the necessary knowledge to be accepted at good universities without 
paying an extra fee for it. The prohibition of preparatory schools spelled a possible 
disaster for the whole industry. Ahmet Tasgetiren, as a member of another Muslim 
community operating preparatory schools, a leading Muslim thinker and journalist, 
points out that a government is not entitled to intervene in the private sphere of 
individuals and companies. Foreseeing the upcoming conflict between the Cemaat 
and the government Tasgetiren pushed the idea that the issue could only be solved 
if the level of education improved increasing the necessity of preparatory schools. 
He ends his article by arguing: “if the contacts between the Cemaat and the 
government get wounded all social environments get wounded as well as the whole 
of Turkey.” (Tasgetiren, 2012) 
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Open conflict with the government 
In November 2013, the AK Parti government came to the final decision to abolish 
the preparatory schools. This step of the AK Parti government scandalized the 
Cemaat and an open letter was written by Fethullah Gulen published on the 
movement’s controversial website, herkul.org. The name of this emblematic 
website regularly defended by Gulen, is problematic because “Her kul” in Turkish 
means “all servants of God”, at the same time Herkul is the Turkish form of 
Hercules, the Roman name of the Greek divine figure of Heracles, a reference 
widely criticized in Turkey for not being Islamic. The above-mentioned writing 
entitled as “You will walk without stopping!” invites followers of Fethullah Gulen 
to continue to work in the Hizmet even though they might hear hideous things 
about its leader. (Aljazeera Turk, 2013) 
On the 15th December 2015, the Turkish public was shocked when they learned 
that Hakan Sukur, the most famous football player of Turkish history, was an 
ardent follower of Fethullah Gulen. He had left the group of AK Parti in the Great 
Turkish National Assembly (Turkiye Buyuk Milli Meclisi, TBMM) and decided to 
keep his mandate to serve as an independent member of the parliament. In his 
open letter the practicing Muslim Sukur, who became a candidate on the personal 
invitation of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, explaining the reasons behind his resignation 
admitted that the ruling party succeeded in many fields but failed in attacking 
Hocaefendi (a name for Gulen used by his followers called by his adherents). Sukur 
says that he has been taking part in the Hizmet for twenty years and he describes 
their political activities as follows: “during the time of the referendum and the 
elections these honest persons supported the AK Parti government, ran from door 
to door, transported thousands of voters from abroad”. (Zaman, 2013) Sukur in this 
quotation probably refers to the 2010 referendum on the change of the 
Constitution and when he speaks about transporting voters his reason for that is at 
that time Turkish citizens residing in another country were not entitled to vote 
unless they went home. Many Turks only proceeded to the border posts or airports 
where special voting polls were placed for them. 
For Sukur, the Cemaat consisting of friends and supporters of the AK Parti 
until then became their enemies. If one considers what happened two days after 
Sukur’s dismissal, one can say that it might have been only a prelude to the 17th and 
25th December events when the main prosecutor of Turkey ordered the arrest of 
several people linked to the government including three sons of ministers (namely 
the minister of the interior Muammer Guler’s son Baris Guler, the minister of 
economics Zafer Caglayan’s son Kaan Caglayan and the minister of environment 
and urbanization Erdogan Bayraktar’s son Abdullah Oguz Bayraktar.) Besides these 
persons, several famous businessmen were also pursued and even Bilal Erdogan, 
the prime minister’s own son was also threatened to be put under arrest.  
After these high tensions and the reactions of the government to which they 
called a mini-coup by the Gulen Movement, Fethullah Gulen wrote a peace 
message to the prime minister on the 4th January, 2014. Erdogan’s response to this 
letter was clear: he was not ready to negotiate with a so called “parallel state” and he 
promised to restrict their opportunities. Using a recent secret service report, a new 
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operation started. On the 7th January, 2014 government loyalists arrested hundreds 
of police officers and civil servants who were believed to belonged to this state in 
the state.  
The next episode in the row of conflicts is connected to the more and more 
uptight security situation near the border with Syria. On the 1st and 19th February, 
2014 prosecutors and civil servants linked to the Gulen Movement searched two 
trucks in two southern cities of Turkey without the proper authorization from the 
national intelligence service. Those who were doing this search claimed that they 
discovered weaponry to be smuggled into the war-torn neighbor country. This 
move of the Cemaat prompted the re-composition of the Supreme Board of Judges 
and Prosecutors, as well as the re-organization of the police. Out of 260.000 
Turkish police officers 1.000 have been dismissed and 4.000 were moved to other 
positions. The discharge of key judges and prosecutors - including Zekeriya Oz 
who played an important role in the Ergenekon trial judging the members of the so 
called Ergenekon conspiracy – continued in 2015, too. This means that the 
government operations against the presumed members and sympathizers goes on 
even at the time of writing this essay. The current accusations include the claim that 
the Gulen Movement put together an armed militia called Otuken after the name of 
the first Turkic capital in Central Asia. 
 
The future of the conflict 
The future of this conflict depends on how much the Gulen Movement would or 
would not erode in the near future. It is also evident that the Cemaat on its own is 
not powerful enough to form a successful political party. If it is so, would they vote 
en masse for an opposition party? The results of the 7th June, 2015 national elections 
show that this might be the most probable scenario with Gulenists gathering under 
the umbrella of the leftist-liberal People’s Democratic Party, which is willing to 
represent all minorities, principally the ethnic Kurds (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi, 
HDP). Thanks to the Gulenist input “the Kurdish left has the opportunity to 
become a more mainstream actor in Turkish politics if the current dedication to the 
peace process is maintained and the Kurdish question is normalized. The three 
major parties – AK Party, CHP and MHP – cannot produce libertarian left-wing 




Our view, after presenting the main stages of this contention, is that the two 
parties, both the AK Parti side and the Gulenist side are centered on key 
personalities such Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Fethullah Gulen who are crucial to 
our proposed solution. A multiple conflict can be detected. There are three 
interpretations to what divides the AK Parti and the Hizmet, three levels, and we 
argue that the third might be the one leading to a certain compromise. 
Detailing the three levels we have found that the first discontent is a conflict 
between world views, the two Islamic approaches: reforming the society in order to 
reform the individual or reforming the individual in order to reform the society. 
Regional and Business Studies Vol 8 No 1 
95 
This is the lowest level and the easiest discord to be solved. The second level is a 
conflict between two strong personalities, two bellwethers who are usually not 
ready to step back and divide the society. So, at the time of writing in July 2015, it is 
not feasible to side with both of them, Muslim Turks are forced to choose. This 
means that if the pacification of the personal conflict opposing them is not 
possible, other denouement is needed. The third level of the conflict is even more 
deeply rooted and linked to the secular nature of the Turkish Republic. In secular 
societies, such as the Turkish laiklik system, the spheres of religion and politics are 
strictly separated on one hand, but on the other, practising individuals might not 
follow the logic enforced by the government. In Islamic societies, the concept of 
taqleed is general and adopted by a large number of Muslims. Taqleed in Arabic 
means blindly following something or someone without looking for evidences from 
authentic sources. Taqleed works because of respect and the lack of knowledge. 
Muslims in their daily religious practice naturally require to follow a mujtahid, a 
scholar of religion and therefore do taqleed in praying, fasting or paying the 
compulsory alms, but it is not necessarily the case when it comes to politics. 
Muslims should question themselves how far they should go in their taqleed outside 
the field of religious jurisprudence. This includes also the opportunity of having 
separate religious and political leaders. Considering religious leaders, political 
advisers might lead to dissension or fitnah like the conflict forming the topic of our 
present paper. Knowing that fitnah is called by the Muslim holy scriptures worse 
than killing humans, no Muslim would oppose that this practice of taqleed in 
Turkish domestic politics should come to an end. We think that the Muslim circles 
and foundations in Turkey should limit themselves to spirituality, and politicians - 
using the core values of Islam or not - should not pose as religious leaders in order 
to break the situation of today in which parallel structures can be built and minds 
can be controlled.  
To settle the dispute between the AK Parti and the Gulen movement, the 
government has to reduce pressure and favor the religious communities by giving 
them a chance to reach out to the people after the closure of the vocational 
schools, but the first step is the duty of Hizmet, even more as they are the ones 
who are losing ground. As the Hizmet tries to focus on the individual - as we 
mentioned earlier -, they have to educate the ordinary members of the Gulen 
Movement so as to distinguish between religious and political leaders especially 
since the submissiveness to two authorities, the government and the Community, 
which is clearly taught by Islam. As the holy book of Islam, the Quran says in the 
chapter n. 4. verse n. 59: “O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger 
and those of you who are in authority” (Pickthal, 1996) Many Muslims from the 
Hizmet think that in such a conflict obeying the government means betraying the 
religious authority, in our case Fethullah Gulen. This is the reason why even those 
who are unhappy with this political conflict are reluctant to quit the Community. 
One of the few who has already made this move is Munip Erdem who has known 
Gulen since 1968 when the latter one was a simple mosque speaker. (Youtube, 2014) 
The education of Gulenists would empower them, let them free choice in politics: 
they would get the chance in this way to decide whether they want to remain 
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conservative or really build a liberal Islamic alternative under the umbrella of the 
HDP, as we suggested in the previous point. 
The Muslim brotherhoods are very useful in general in Turkish society by giving 
shelter, food or medical assistance as well as spiritual support to the needy, but at 
the same time they convey some secret teachings to their followers. Opening up 
this partly obscure world is the only way of avoiding a future movement of building 
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